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THE USE OF EMS PERSONNEL AS INTELLIGENCE SENSORS: 





The use of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel1 as intelligence sensors or 
information collectors to provide information to Terrorism Early Warning Groups 
(TEWGs) and other local and state government intelligence fusion centers is 
recommended by numerous academic papers, professional articles and presentations, 
and U.S. Department of Homeland Security best-practice documents. These documents 
identify EMS personnel as valuable intelligence sensors, in part because they have 
access to locations not routinely available to law enforcement or intelligence 
communities that may contain indicators of terrorism.2    
In spite of these recommendations, exceptionally few TEWGs have incorporated EMS 
personnel into their information collection systems. While many TEWGs are interested 
in integrating EMS collection assets, they have not developed this capability because 
they are confounded by the complex legal, operational, professional, cultural, and 
societal challenges of using EMS personnel in this capacity. Conversely, at least one 
intelligence fusion center developed an EMS-based information collection system, but 
overlooked federal and state medical confidentiality laws and other strategic issues.3   
There has been no significant debate among federal, state, and local intelligence, 
EMS, law enforcement, homeland security, and medical communities regarding the best 
practices and strategic consequences of using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors.4 
Absent an such an interdisciplinary debate leading to the development of model EMS 
information collection practice standards and the articulation of clearly defined public 
benefit, elected officials, the leadership of the EMS and medical communities, and other 
policymakers will not sanction the use of EMS personnel in this capacity, resulting in 
the inability to use EMS personnel as information collectors to prevent terrorism. 
Best practices for using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors must be developed  
because: (1) numerous TEWGs want to integrate EMS personnel as information 
collectors; (2) in the absence of peer-reviewed best practices, some TEWGs are 
instituting information collection practices that breach federal or state medical 
confidentiality laws, which may result in the unlawful disclosure, reception, and use of 
protected health information; (3) there are material civil, administrative, and criminal 
penalties for the improper disclosure, reception, or use of protected health information; 
and (4) ad hoc collection practices that breach the public’s trust and expectation of 
medical confidentiality may result in the loss of this valuable collection asset or the 
creation of inordinately risk-averse TEWG oversight mechanisms.   
In addition to discussing the strategic and legal issues and recommending practices 
for the use of EMS personnel as information collectors to support intelligence fusion 
centers, this article aims to stimulate debate among the intelligence, EMS, homeland 
security, law enforcement, and medical communities regarding the role of EMS 
personnel in supporting intelligence fusions centers.  
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THE VALUE OF EMS PERSONNEL AS INTELLIGENCE SENSORS  
EMS personnel can function as high quality intelligence sensors. They respond to 
emergencies in residences and businesses owned, rented, or operated by all 
demographic groups in all geographic areas on short notice, usually arriving within 
eight minutes of the request for service. In many instances, the reporting party does not 
have time to “clean” the scene; thus indicators of terrorist ideology, planning, or 
operations may be visible when emergency responders arrive. Additionally, most people 
do not react defensively to EMS personnel and may not perceive a need to clean the 
scene. Patients seeking medical care may be unable to disguise suspicious injuries 
associated with the logistics of terrorism, such as burns or other trauma from chemical 
agents or explosives. EMS personnel carrying discreet chemical or radiological detection 
devices could provide the ability to check sites throughout a jurisdiction for potential 
precursors to terrorism that would otherwise be difficult to assess.  
The use of EMS personnel as information collectors would markedly increase the 
number of intelligence sensors in the community and the number of contacts capable of 
yielding information. In one major west coast city, with a population of approximately 
780,000, there are more than 2,000 fire department and ambulance personnel who 
respond to more than 80,000 EMS calls annually.5 While the range of calls varies 
greatly by jurisdiction, a rough estimate is an annual average of 800 to 1,000 EMS calls 
per 10,000 population.  
EMS personnel are well versed at determining the veracity of statements and patient 
histories, especially in situations when the stated history is inconsistent with the signs 
and symptoms or physical evidence. EMS personnel are skilled at recognizing dangerous 
or suspicious environments, and often have a good sense of community concerns due to 
their frequent interaction with the public. 
Because EMS personnel often respond to calls in residences or businesses, they have 
access to the three traditional types of terrorism indicators: trait-based indicators, 
behavior-based indicators, and incident or site-based indicators. Trait indicators are 
based on an individual’s or community’s characteristics, such as race, religion, ethnicity, 
or national origin.6 The use of these indicators has numerous limitations, including high 
rates of false positives and false negatives, engendering distrust between government 
and target communities, and a perception of racially, religiously, or ethnically-based 
persecution. Behavioral indicators are based upon persons’ or communities’ activities, 
conduct, or behaviors, rather than their characteristics.7 Incident or site indicators are 
based upon what can be observed, heard, or otherwise sensed. Incident-based indicators 
are particularly valuable because they can identify evidence of terrorist ideology, 
planning, and operations. Ideological indicators include pictures, flags, or literature 
representing terrorists or terrorist organizations.  Planning indicators include 
photographs or plans of critical infrastructure and detailed information about high-
value sites. Operations indicators include weapons, explosives, chemicals, or timing 
devices. For EMS personnel, incident-based indicators do not include the patient’s 
complaint, history, signs, or symptoms. These are considered medically-based 
indicators, which EMS personnel identify as part of their patient assessment. 
Despite the potential benefit of using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors, a 
number of strategic questions must be considered. Will EMS personnel want to function 
as intelligence sensors? Will using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors conflict with 
society’s expectations of medical professionals? Will using EMS personnel to collect 
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terrorism information reduce the total terrorism information received or reduce the 
number of calls for EMS service? Will using EMS personnel as information collectors 
violate medical confidentially laws? 
EMS PERSONNEL ISSUES 
Pre-hospital personnel will have varied reactions to serving as intelligence sensors to 
support intelligence fusion centers. Some EMS personnel will embrace this 
responsibility, believing it supports a safer community and nation. Others will avoid this 
responsibility because they believe it creates new risks and may interfere with their 
primary emergency medical care mission. These strategic issues deserve careful 
evaluation.  
Serving as an information collector to support an intelligence fusion center is not 
without risk to individuals, their coworkers, organizations participating in the program, 
and the EMS discipline generally. Individual responders may place themselves and their 
coworkers at risk of physical harm, if terrorists or criminal organizations perceive that 
responders are providing information to law enforcement or intelligence fusion centers. 
EMS personnel commonly do not report contraband, illicit items, or violations of the 
law to law enforcement, unless there is an imminent threat to the rescuer; they do not 
want to be considered law enforcement informants, a perception that could leave them 
vulnerable to reprisals on future emergency responses.8 Criminal informants, if 
identified, often need protection and their careers may end.9 Emergency response 
personnel who are perceived as informants could be summoned to an ambush or other 
form of reprisal with a phone call.  
Even if only a few EMS personnel participate in a collection program, a risk could be 
created for all personnel in that organization, as the public or targets will not necessarily 
differentiate between those who are participating and those who are not.  However, the 
risk of reprisals against EMS personnel can be minimized if they collect and report only 
indicators of terrorism, not indicators of criminal activity. Even if terrorists suspect that 
EMS personnel are intelligence sensors, clandestine terrorist organizations planning or 
supporting an attack in America are unlikely to threaten or assail a paramedic, because 
to do so would attract the scrutiny of law enforcement. Many jurisdictions will 
determine that this possible risk to EMS personnel is outweighed by the opportunity to 
identify a terrorist’s planning or operations by using EMS personnel as intelligence 
collectors. While that determination may be appropriate, the potential risk to EMS 
personnel must be carefully considered.   
Intelligence gathering by pre-hospital personnel may interfere with traditional 
medical and health care missions. Two foundational principles of medical care are that 
clinicians will provide care without moral judgment and hold sacrosanct information 
provided by a patient. Medical confidentiality seeks to maximize patient communication 
with medical professionals, so that fear of disclosure will not deter people from seeking 
medical help and securing a diagnosis and adequate treatment. Medical confidentiality 
also seeks to encourage medical professionals to be candid in recording information in 
patient medical records, and to protect patients' privacy against disclosure of sensitive 
personal information.10 Many clinicians believe that because of these principles, patients 
seek care they would otherwise decline if the circumstances of the care were disclosed. 11 
Some EMS personnel consider that reporting patient information (provided to them 
with an expectation of privacy) to TEWGs violates these health care principles and 
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refuse to provide that information – even if that information prevents or preempts a 
potential terrorist attack. Disaffected EMS personnel may refuse to participate in a 
collection program, provide disinformation to fusion centers, or become “whistle 
blowers.” (During the author’s presentation on this subject, to approximately 100 pre-
hospital personnel, most were interested in participating in an information collection 
program. However, about twenty-five attendees stated they would not, under any 
circumstances, participate in such a program.)12 
SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS OF EMS PERSONNEL  
The American public expects privacy from their medical practitioners and feels strongly 
that health information and medical records are confidential and must not be released 
to others without the patient’s permission.13  Citing a Louis Harris poll, Beth Givens, 
director of the Privacy Rights Council noted that “In 1995, 82% of those polled, or four 
out of five, said they are somewhat or very concerned about threats to their personal 
privacy. This is up from 64% in 1978”. Mainstream privacy groups identify secondary 
use of medical information without the patient’s permission by unrelated third parties, 
including law enforcement, as “privacy abuse.”14 Absent compelling research to the 
contrary, we can presume that the public’s expectation of privacy extends to EMS 
professionals. This expectation is certainly legitimate, as EMS personnel are included in 
the federal and exemplar state medical confidentiality laws. 
If EMS participation in information collection and reporting programs is publicly 
known, members of the public, especially within marginalized communities, may believe 
they are being spied upon by pre-hospital personnel. This will breach the public’s 
expectation of medical confidentiality and exacerbate distrust of the government, which 
may result in members of those communities refusing to use emergency services. 
Preventable morbidity and mortality would result if segments of the public stopped 
using emergency medical services or other health services. This is an utterly 
unacceptable consequence, which would require termination of the EMS collection and 
reporting program.  
The use of EMS personnel as information collectors also involves issues similar to the 
community-based policing versus proactive or intelligence policing dichotomy. 
Advocates of community-based or crime-response and prevention policing believe 
intelligence gathering by police will interfere with their traditional crime-fighting and 
social-services mission.15 This argument asserts, in part, that using police for 
intelligence purposes may alienate those communities that are the target of the 
intelligence operations, which may result in the alienated communities becoming less 
likely to report criminal activity or cooperate with police investigations, which correlates 
with higher rates of crime.16 When applied to using EMS personnel as information 
collectors, this issue considers whether the government’s use of individuals who are 
expected to maintain medical confidentiality as intelligence sensors is strategically 
counterproductive. The use of EMS personnel as intelligence sensors may be interpreted 
by certain communities as evidence that they are under constant surveillance and not 
trusted. This could engender community distrust, causing potential leads – that might 
otherwise be reported – to not be reported, resulting in a decrease of terrorist-related 
information from those communities. 
Finally, another risk of using any non-law enforcement information sources, 
including EMS personnel, as information collectors is that alienated communities will 
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request redress from government policymakers. Municipal, county, or state 
policymakers may refuse to support the use of non-law enforcement personnel as 
information collectors, prohibiting those personnel from performing intelligence 
collection functions, or sanctioning those organizations through legislative or budgetary 
controls. 
LEGAL ISSUES  
Because TEWGs and other fusion centers have historically not used medical personnel 
as collection assets, the federal and state medical confidentiality laws and state 
mandatory reporting laws that relate to EMS personnel have not been relevant to their 
operations. However, it is critical that EMS personnel, EMS employers, and TEWGs that 
utilize EMS collection assets understand these laws, because they define the 
circumstances under which confidential medical information may be disclosed, 
received, or used.  
Within the United States, a patient’s17 health information is protected from 
unauthorized disclosure, reception, or use through a rubric of federal and state laws. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s (HIPAA) Privacy Rule 
prescribes the federal requirements to protect the privacy of patients’ health 
information and defines specific exemptions for disclosure of that information. In 
addition to the federal protections afforded by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, each state has a 
confidentially of medical information law that provides specific protections for medical 
and health information. Finally, each state has laws that compel health care providers 
and others to report to governmental agencies acts or conditions that identify abuse, 
crimes, or threats to public health and safety.  
This article examines the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the confidentiality and mandatory 
reporting laws from the State of California for two reasons: California has a number of 
established intelligence fusion centers and the author is familiar with EMS operations in 
California. Not all the laws reviewed in the context of this article will apply to all states 
or agencies.18  
The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) mandated the 
development of standards to protect the privacy of individually identifiable health 
information held or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associates in any 
form, including electronic, paper, or oral.19 These standards are contained in the 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, commonly called 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule or Privacy Rule.20 The purpose of the Privacy Rule is to prevent 
the unauthorized disclosure of a patient’s protected health information and define the 
specific circumstances when protected health information may be disclosed or used, 
with or without authorization. The Privacy Rule applies to “covered entities,” which 
generally includes health plans and health care providers that transmit health 
information electronically for claims or billing, benefit eligibility inquiries, or referral 
authorization requests.21 Nearly all public and private sector ambulance providers and 
first response agencies that bill government sponsored or other health plans for services 
are considered covered entities.  
The Privacy Rule mandates that a covered entity must disclose protected health 
information in two situations: to patients or their representatives when they request 
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access to that information or to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
when it is conducting an investigation or taking enforcement action. The Privacy Rule 
also permits, but does not compel, the covered entity to use or disclose protected health 
information without the patient’s authorization in five categories of situations. One of 
these categories of situations – specific public interest and benefit activities – contains 
two lawful disclosure uses that authorize health care providers, including EMS 
personnel, to release protected health care information to law enforcement.22 These 
lawful disclosure uses are (1) supporting specific law enforcement purposes and (2) to 
prevent or lesson the threat to serious health or safety.23  
Covered health care providers providing emergency care at the scene of a medical 
emergency that is not on the provider’s premises may disclose protected health 
information to law enforcement to alert law enforcement to the commission or nature of 
a crime, the location of a crime and its victims, or to report the identity, description, or 
location of the perpetrator of the crime.24 This provision relates directly to EMS 
personnel; they are the only health care providers who routinely provide emergency 
medical care at locations other than their own premises.25 
Covered health care entities, consistent with law and ethical conduct, may also use or 
disclose protected health information when the health care provider believes the use or 
disclosure “is necessary to lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety 
of a person or the public” and the disclosure is made to a person able to prevent or 
lessen that threat.26 This disclosure is presumed to be made in good faith if the health 
care provider relied on assertions made by a person who could credibly have knowledge 
of a threat to public health and safety.27 This authorization supports EMS personnel 
informing law enforcement or TEWGs about potential terrorist threats, based upon a 
patient’s history or statement, or signs and symptoms, provided the EMS personnel 
believe the patient’s actions pose a serious and imminent threat to public health and 
safety and the law enforcement officer or TEWG is able to prevent or lessen the threat. 
In the situation of a terrorist being injured while manufacturing an improvised explosive 
device or chemical agent, reporting protected health information to law enforcement is 
justified – the person has already created a serious and imminent threat, has caused an 
injury to him/herself, has placed on-scene public safety personnel at risk, and may be 
creating a serious and imminent threat to the public.28  
The Privacy Rule also allows the disclosure and use of protected health information 
for specialized governmental functions, including national security and intelligence 
activities. Pursuant to this exemption, a covered entity may disclose protected health 
information to authorized federal officials to support intelligence, counterintelligence, 
and other national security activities.29  Disclosures made to authorized federal officials 
for national security or intelligence purposes are also exempted from a Privacy Rule 
requirement that covered entities identify all disclosures of protected health information 
made during the past six years, including disclosures to non-federal law enforcement 
agencies, upon the request of the patient.30 These disclosure and reporting exemptions 
provide a method for FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and similar organizations using 
federal officials, to confidentially access protected medical information that may contain 
indicators of terrorism, after receiving an initial lead from a TEWG or other source.31  
HIPAA provides criminal and civil penalties for failure to comply with the Privacy 
Rule. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services may fine covered entities up 
to one hundred dollars per occurrence for failing to comply with the Privacy Rule, and 
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up to a maximum of $25,000 annually for repeated violations of the same requirement. 
A person who knowingly discloses or uses individually identifiable health information 
may be criminally fined up to $50,000 and imprisoned for up to one year. If the illegal 
conduct involves false pretenses, the maximum fine increases to $100,000, and possible 
imprisonment increases up to five years. If a person unlawfully sells, transfers, or uses 
individually identifiable health information for commercial gain, the maximum fine is 
$250,000 and the maximum imprisonment is ten years. Criminal sanctions to enforce 
the Privacy Rule can only be applied by the U.S. Department of Justice.32  
State Confidentiality of Medical Information Laws  
In addition to understanding the requirements of the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule, EMS 
personnel, their employers, and TEWGs that use EMS personnel as intelligence sensors 
must understand the requirements of their state’s medical confidentiality laws and 
mandatory reporting laws to comprehend what information may be legally reported to 
TEWGs. The content of these laws varies greatly by state, but generally identifies who is 
covered by the law; prohibits the release, sharing, or disclosure of medical information 
without the patient’s permission; and identifies specific exemptions when information 
must or may be disclosed without the patient’s authorization. 33 
In California, the primary medical privacy law is the California Confidentiality of 
Medical Information Act.34 This law applies to all licensed or certified health care 
professionals, including physicians, nurses, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and 
paramedics. The law also applies to organizations that store medical information, and 
organizations that employ health care personnel, such as EMS first responder agencies 
and ambulance providers.35  
The California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act states, “No provider of 
health care, health care service plan or contractor shall disclose medical information 
regarding a patient of the provider of health care or an enrollee or subscriber of a health 
care services plan without first obtaining an authorization.”36 The Act broadly construes 
medical information to include any element of information that allows identification of 
the individual, alone or when matched with other publicly available information.37 Thus, 
except for defined exemptions, the Act comprehensively prohibits the release of a 
patient’s medical information, including information which could be correlated with 
dispatch records or other public information to allow identification of the patient, 
without the patient’s authorization.  
The Act contains nine exemptions that compel covered entities to release information 
without a patient’s authorization. These exemptions are limited to actions taken 
pursuant to court orders, subpoenas, investigations by agencies with regulatory 
oversight, search warrants, requests by a coroner under specific conditions, and when 
required by law.38 The Act also contains eighteen exemptions when health care 
providers or others may disclose patient information. These conditions include 
furthering the treatment of patients among medical providers in emergencies, 
facilitating the payment of medical bills when the patient is unable to give authorization, 
allowing review and oversight by licensing and accrediting bodies, facilitating clinical 
research, supporting coroners’ investigations, evaluating insurance plan coverage, 
determining the need for conservatorship, and supporting post-death organ transplant. 
Additionally, demographic information may be provided to a disaster relief organization 
to respond to welfare inquiries. Medical information may also be disclosed to a local 
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health department to assist in the prevention or control of diseases, and to support 
public health surveillance, investigations, and interventions.  
None of these compulsory or permissive disclosure provisions allow EMS providers to 
release a patient’s medical information to law enforcement or to a TEWG, even if that 
medical record suggests activities consistent with terrorist ideologies, planning, or 
operations. While EMS personnel could disclose medical information to EMS regulatory 
agencies, such as local EMS agencies,39 these agencies are prohibited from disclosing 
that information to parties that are not otherwise authorized to receive or use that 
information.40 
   The California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act provides criminal and civil 
penalties, including compensatory and punitive damages, for unauthorized disclosure of 
medical information in violation of the Act.41 (Other state laws provide additional 
remedies.) The civil, administrative, and criminal penalties for violating the California 
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act are severe. In the context of EMS personnel 
releasing medical information to law enforcement or TEWGs in violation of the Act, the 
penalties could be applied against the person unlawfully disclosing the information, 
against the employing agency, and against the TEWG for unlawfully receiving or using 
the information. For EMS personnel, a criminal conviction under this act will probably 
cause the revocation of their license, termination of their employment, and end their 
careers.42 For the TEWG organization, a criminal conviction under this act would result 
in scrutiny that would threaten the viability of the organization and the local and state 
intelligence fusion center concept.  
State Mandatory Reporting Laws 
Like other states, California has laws that require health care providers to report certain 
acts of violence to local law enforcement and certain diseases to the public health officer. 
While pre-hospital personnel are not required to report under either of these laws, they 
are relevant because many EMS personnel erroneously believe these laws allow them to 
report otherwise confidential information to law enforcement.  
California Penal Code Section 11160 provides that health practitioners employed in 
certain facilities, or employed by a local or state public health department, must report 
to a law enforcement agency any patient who presents with injuries that are self 
inflicted, inflicted by another with a firearm, or that appear to be the result of actual or 
attempted assault or abusive conduct. (Assault or abusive conduct includes any of 
twenty-three crimes, including manslaughter, torture, battery, incest, rape, throwing 
any caustic chemical with intent to injure, child abuse or endangerment, abuse of 
spouse, lewd acts with a child, and elder abuse.) The content of the report made by the 
health practitioner to law enforcement is not limited, and could reasonably include the 
patient’s medical record, which would otherwise be confidential.43 This law applies only 
to the specific health care providers identified within the law, which does not include 
EMTs and paramedics (EMS personnel). Thus, EMS personnel in California may not 
release confidential medical information directly to law enforcement or a TEWG. 
However, hospital-based physicians and nurses are compulsory reporters under this 
law. Information reported by EMS personnel to hospital personnel is reportable by 
hospital personnel to law enforcement as part of this law’s compulsory reporting 
requirements, making the interpretation of this law relevant to how EMS personnel 
could report medical information that may indicate terrorist planning and operations. 
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California Code of Regulations, Title 17, Section 2500 requires certain health care 
providers, including physicians, mid-level practitioners, nurses, infection control 
personnel, but not EMS personnel, to report to the local health officer in which the 
patient resides, any of eighty-eight diseases or conditions. These diseases include the 
Category A Bioterrorism Agents and diseases on the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s list of Bioterrorism Agents and Diseases.44 When no health care providers 
are present, any person aware of an individual suspected to be suffering from any of the 
covered diseases may notify the health officer.45 While EMS personnel are not 
mandatory reporters, they may permissively report a patient suspected of these diseases 
to local health authorities in the absence of a compulsory reporter. This law does not 
allow EMS personnel to report this information to TEWGs or law enforcement. 
Other California laws and regulations compel reporting of confidential medical 
information to law enforcement, public health, and environmental health authorities. 
Emergency medical technicians and paramedics must report child abuse and dependent 
elder abuse.46 However, within the performance of their pre-hospital duties, this 
reporting, while essential to protect public safety, does not provide a mechanism to 
report medical information or signs and symptoms that could indicate planning or other 
preparation for terrorism.  
Evaluating the Legal Rubric 
To determine how medical confidentiality and disclosure laws affect the ability of EMS 
personnel to provide information to intelligence fusion centers, the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
and state confidentiality and disclosure laws must be jointly analyzed. Except for 
specific exemptions, the HIPAA Privacy Rule preempts contrary portions of state law.47 
The Privacy Rule provides two principle exceptions to the general rule of federal 
preemption. These exceptions apply if the state law: (1) more stringently protects health 
information or grants the patient greater access to his or her health information; or (2) 
provides for the reporting of  certain diseases or injury, child abuse, or public health 
surveillance, investigation or intervention.48 This preemption test creates a floor or 
minimum standard for protection of medical information. If a state law provides a 
higher level of medical privacy, the level created by the state law applies. State laws for 
reporting disease, criminally-caused injury, or public health investigations are not 
preempted. 49 There are other exceptions to preemption, which are not relevant to this 
discussion. 
Section 164.512(f) (6) of the HIPAA Privacy Rule allows EMS providers, in response 
to a medical emergency that is not on the EMS provider’s premises, to disclose protected 
health information to law enforcement, if that disclosure is necessary to alert law 
enforcement about the commission and nature of a crime, the location of the crime or its 
victims, or the identity of the perpetrator of the crime.50 Section 164.512 (j) of the 
Privacy Rule allows EMS providers to use or disclose protected health information when 
the health care provider believes the disclosure is necessary to lessen a serious and 
imminent threat to the health and safety of a person or the public and the disclosure is 
made to a person able to prevent or lessen that threat.51 Section 164.512(k)(2) of the 
Privacy Rule permits EMS personnel to disclose protected health information to 
authorized federal officials to support intelligence, counter intelligence, and other 
national security activities.52 
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None of these provisions preempt the California Confidentiality of Medical 
Information Act’s prohibition against unauthorized use or disclosure of a patient’s 
health information because the state law more stringently protects that information. 
Thus, EMS personnel in California may not report confidential medical information to 
law enforcement or a TEWG to alert law enforcement about the commission and nature 
of a crime, the location of the crime or its victims, or the identity of the perpetrator of 
the crime, or to lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of a person 
or the public. Nor may EMS personnel report confidential medical information to 
authorized federal officials to support intelligence, counter intelligence, and other 
national security activities.53  
California law is generally more severe than the Privacy Rule regarding sanctions for 
unlawfully disclosing health information, and is not preempted by HIPAA. For some 
specific violations, such as unlawful disclosure of protected health information under 
false pretenses, the Privacy Rule’s penalties are harsher. In these situations, the harsher 
penalty would be applied. For a case to be made under the Privacy Rule there must be 
specific intent to violate the law. For a case to be made under California law, only 
negligent disclosure is necessary. Under the Privacy Rule, an action must be brought by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services or the U.S. Department of Justice; 
however, under the California Confidentiality of Medical Information act, an individual 
patient or numerous governmental attorneys may initiate legal action.54  
In summary, the exercise of the three lawful disclosure provisions in the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule that allow EMS personnel to disclose protected health information to law 
enforcement are prohibited by the more stringent requirements of the California 
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. Furthermore, in California there are no 
mandatory reporting laws that allow EMTs and paramedics (EMS personnel) to report 
medical indicators of terrorism to law enforcement or a TEWG. Disclosure of protected 
medical information carries heavy penalties; the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the California 
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act provide material sanctions for those who use 
or disclose protected health information without authorization.  
Therefore, EMS personnel are not allowed to report confidential medical information 
to law enforcement or a TEWG, even if that information suggests terrorist planning or 
operations. The inability to report confidential medical information creates ethical and 
moral challenges for the paramedic who discovers medically-based indicators of 
terrorism that she believes should be reported to law enforcement. These professional, 
societal, and operational issues are examined in the balance of this article.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the use of EMS personnel as information collectors may be controversial, 
there is a realistic probability that an EMS responder at the scene of a medical 
emergency may provide information to prevent, preempt, or interdict a terrorist attack. 
Based on the evaluation of each issue identified in this article, the use of EMS personnel 
in this capacity is both ethical and legitimate, given certain constraints. 
EMS personnel should only collect and report incident-based indicators and non-
medical behavior-based indicators of terrorism to TEWGs. This information, which does 
not include protected health information, is high-value information. Incident-based 
indicators have low rates of false-positive and false-negative leads, because collectors 
can clearly articulate what they observe and why it is suspicious. In response to a call for 
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medical assistance, a paramedic enters a residence and observes a case of Casio watches, 
soldering irons, wiring, and numerous suitcases. A paramedic who has received 
terrorism awareness training would understand that the wiring and the number of 
watches are suspicious and potentially related to terrorism because they can be used to 
construct time- or altitude-triggered detonators. Furthermore, when considered with 
the watches and wiring, the suitcases are suspicious because they could be used to 
covertly deploy explosive devices on planes or aircraft.  
Behavior-based indicators of terrorism may also be valuable, but are often less 
specific than incident-based indicators of terrorism. A paramedic responds to a 
residence for a middle age male complaining of severe chest pain and shortness of 
breath—a potential heart attack. The paramedic notes that two men try to delay his 
access to the patient, while two other men speak quickly in hushed voices to the patient, 
and then rapidly and anxiously leave the residence. A paramedic who has received 
terrorism awareness training might report this behavior to the local TEWG, especially if 
incident-based indicators of terrorism were also present. However, it would be difficult 
to determine whether this behavior, which could be considered suspicious, has any link 
to terrorism.  
Incident-based and non-medical behavior-based information can be fused with 
publicly available information, such as dispatch records, to create valuable intelligence. 
This practice will result in EMS personnel providing a manageable quantity of high-
quality information inputs into the intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis process.  
The release of confidential medical information by EMS personnel to TEWGs adds 
little value to the intelligence fusion process. A suspicious injury (such as burns to both 
arms) and an implausible history not consistent with the injury only indicate the patient 
burned his arms other than described, not that the burns were specifically related to 
terrorist activities. While medically-based indicators such as injuries with inconsistent 
histories may indicate terrorist-related activities, it routinely indicates a patient’s 
attempt to cloak the ridiculus and embarrassing – yet lawful – circumstances of an 
injury. Reporting every inconsistent physical presentation and history that might 
suggest terrorism would generate many false-positive leads, which would exhaust 
analysts’ time and cloud the database with misleading data, reducing the acuity of the 
analysis. Similarly, depending on pre-hospital personnel to report clinically-based 
information from the pre-hospital setting would generate false-negative or missed leads, 
because EMS personnel cannot reliably differentiate diseases associated with 
bioterrorism from other routine diseases or ascribe the etiology of many injuries. 
Even when supported by state and federal law, EMS personnel should not disclose 
protected health and medical information to law enforcement or TEWGs, at least until 
such time as there has been a dialogue on the role of EMS personnel serving as 
information collectors. The release of a patient’s protected medical information is 
contrary to the societal expectations of privacy and the medical profession’s 
fundamental ethical principle of patient privacy.55 Absent a national interdisciplinary 
dialogue, medical professionals and the public will consider the release of patients’ 
confidential medical information, by EMS personnel to TEWGs, a serious ethical 
breach.  
Further, reporting clinical information from the pre-hospital setting is not necessary, 
because it is available elsewhere. State mandatory reporting laws require hospital-based 
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personnel to report many clinical indicators of terrorism, including injuries that suggest 
violence against a person, to law enforcement.  
Recommendation 1: Develop Stakeholder Support and Identify Standards 
and Best Practices 
If programs using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors to support intelligence fusions 
centers are implemented nationally, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human services should convene medical intelligence 
working groups to develop collection standards and to clarify regulation. These groups 
should advocate the collection and sharing of information that could identify terrorist 
planning or operations, while protecting the health and medical privacy rights of all 
patients. Working groups need to include representative organizations from the state 
and local intelligence, law enforcement, EMS, legal, and medical communities, 
specifically including medical ethicists. While this type of collaborative process may 
appear unnecessary or counterproductive to representatives from established 
intelligence fusion centers, EMS or medically-based information collection programs 
developed surreptitiously or without the support of stakeholder communities are likely 
to fail amid political scandal. Print and electronic media records are replete with reports 
of local and state governments involved in non-criminal intelligence or surveillance 
operations.56 Common themes of these reports are allegations of “spying on the public,” 
improper use of personnel, public demands for an investigation, replacement of high-
level staff, and increased oversight. It is unlikely that the EMS profession or other 
medical professions, which are expected to protect patient confidentiality, would expose 
themselves to those potential charges, absent a national consensus.    
Recommendation 2: Parameters for Program Development 
Terrorism Early Warning Groups or EMS organizations wishing to develop an EMS-
based information collection program to support intelligence fusion and analysis should 
approach this issue methodically. The following steps are recommended: 
1. Consult with the agency’s legal counsel to review the HIPAA Privacy Rule, state 
confidentiality of medical information laws, state mandatory reporting laws, 
and related local laws or ordinances. Determine how these laws will affect the 
EMS provider’s information collection and reporting efforts.  
2. Identify and train at least one EMS agency Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO). 
The EMS agency’s TLO will be the primary point of contact between the EMS 
organization and the TEWG. This person will assume responsibility for program 
development and operations, including initial and recurring staff training, vetting 
and reporting information to the TEWG, serving as the key point of contact for 
the EMS organization, and receiving intelligence products generated by the 
TEWG that the EMS agency has a right and need to know.  
3. Based on the advice of legal counsel, develop a proposed collection and 
reporting protocol. This protocol should be cooperatively developed by the EMS 
organization and the TEWG. The protocol should be reviewed by the EMS 
regulatory authority to assure its use is authorized and employees’ licenses or 
certifications will not be jeopardized by participation in the program. Employee 
labor organizations should review and comment on the protocol to address 
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labor’s concerns and to garner support for the program. In organizations without 
organized labor representation, employee review can be accomplished through 
vertically- and horizontally-structured employee groups that include formal and 
informal organizational leaders.  
4. Secure the support of appropriate policy makers. Based on local norms and the 
direction of executive personnel, the program may be reviewed by elected 
officials or community leaders. Organizational leaders must determine whether 
the public disclosure or dialogue about the use of EMS personnel as intelligence 
sensors increases the probably of the program’s long term success.  
5. Develop the EMS organization’s information collection program. The EMS 
collection program must include structures and processes for the effective and 
timely transfer of EMS field personnel’s observations to the TEWG. In addition to 
training staff, this will include developing policies to report information, 
standardizing paper reporting forms or database reporting templates, and 
reviewing processes. These systems should be developed leveraging the expertise 
of the EMS organization, the TLO, and the TEWG. While outside the scope of this 
article, well-designed reporting forms can fully mitigate the inability to access 
medically-based indicators of terrorism that EMS personnel may not lawfully 
disclose to TEWGs.   
6. Allow employees to confidentially opt into the information collection program. 
Requiring employees to opt into the program reinforces that participation is 
voluntary. While employees may identify participants and non-participants 
through attendance at trainings or while reporting, the goal is to allow employees 
to participate or not participate without experiencing overt or indirect pressure 
from peers or management, which may result in attempts to sabotage the 
program.  
7. Train participating EMS personnel as information collectors. Field-level EMS 
personnel should be trained to collect information, through an EMS-specific 
program. The training curriculum must provide learners with competencies to: 
(a) understand the role and responsibilities of EMS personnel in information 
collection to support intelligence fusion and analysis; (b) identify the benefits, 
limitations and issues of different types of indictors of terrorism, such as trait-
based indicators, behavior-based indicators, site- or incident-based indicators, 
and medical-based indicators; (c) recognize incident- or site-based indicators of 
terrorism planning and operations; (d) articulate the legal and ethical issues 
associated with medical confidentiality and protected health information; (e) 
understand the history, cultures, and beliefs of various terrorist organizations; 
and f) be aware of local terrorism issues.  
8. Develop a comprehensive public information plan that explains why EMS 
personnel are being used in this capacity. This should be a joint effort, between 
the TEWG or fusion center and the EMS agency. While a public information plan 
may seem counterproductive to a fusion center’s goals, information about the 
collection program will become public. Charges of domestic spying and the 
associated negative public relations can be minimized if the collection program’s 
PETRIE, EMS AS INTEL SENSORS 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOL. III, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2007) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
14 
goals, legitimate rationale, and respect for privacy and medical confidentiality 
laws are disclosed in advance of the program.  
Recommendation 3: Summary EMS Information Collection Protocol  
Before beginning an EMS information collection program, every organization should 
develop a protocol to prescribe practices for information collection and the 
organization’s review and referral of that information. While presenting an EMS 
organization’s comprehensive information collecting and reporting protocol is beyond 
the scope of this article (it must incorporate a specific organization’s legal analysis and 
operational structures and processes), such a protocol should minimally consider the 
following elements:  
Awareness 
• EMS personnel should be alert to incident-based indicators of terrorism on every 
call, including vehicle accidents and calls to residences, businesses, and public 
spaces. 
• EMS personnel should be alert to the behavior of those on scene, including family 
and friends of the patient. 
Information Collection  
• EMS personnel should only collect and report scene- or incident-based indicators 
of terrorism. 
• EMS personnel should continue to report or not report indicators of non-
terrorism related crime, as determined by agency or personal practice.  
• Confidential medical information should not be released or disclosed to law 
enforcement or TEWGs, unless compelled by mandatory reporting laws or legal 
order. (Confidential medical information includes the patient’s signs, symptoms, 
current and past medical history, and communication with the patient, whether 
in written, oral, or other form.) 
Reporting 
• If indicators of terrorism are observed and responder safety is at risk, EMS 
personnel should call local law enforcement immediately or as soon as is safe. 
• If indicators of terrorism indicate an attack is imminent, EMS personnel should 
call local law enforcement or the local 24/7 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) immediately or as soon as is safe. 
• Other indicators of terrorism should be routed through the EMS organization’s 
TLO to the TEWG, as per protocol, using the organization’s information 
reporting forms.  
Confidentiality Verification and Process and Quality Improvement 
At least quarterly, the TLO should examine the terrorism information reporting inputs, 
processes, and outputs to determine whether: 
• There was any breach in patient privacy; 
• Information was reviewed in a timely manner by the TLO and provided to the 
TEWG; 
• Areas for improvement or successes were identified by information collectors; 
• Any changes in the program are required. 
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Recommendation 4: Reform State Laws to Provide Consistent Mandatory 
Reporting Requirements for Medical Professionals  
States should review their laws and mandated reporting requirements to assure 
consistency and, if possible, compatibility with HIPAA.  For example, California’s 
fragmented and incongruent compulsory reporting laws have disparate definitions of 
health care providers, resulting in a confusing arrangement of compulsory reporters for 
various injuries, diseases, and conditions. The variances in mandatory reporters 
contained within these laws are not rational. A paramedic employed by a local 
department of health has different reporting requirements than a paramedic employed 
by a fire department or private ambulance company.57 A common definition of 
healthcare provider across these statutes and regulations would result in more uniform 
reporting and improved safety for the victims of crime and abuse.  
CONCLUSION 
EMS personnel can be valuable information collectors to support terrorism intelligence 
fusions centers. They can provide important information inputs that would not 
otherwise be available to fusion centers. However, every intelligence fusion center and 
EMS organization considering such a program must carefully analyze the legal, ethical, 
societal, and organizational issues unique to that EMS organization. Each EMS 
organization must use a methodical information collection implementation process, 
which includes legal analysis, developing a collection protocol, designating a terrorism 
liaison officer, designing a collection program, garnering employee support, training 
field employees, and assuring patient privacy. 
In the longer term, the success and acceptance of the use of EMS personnel as 
information collectors to support terrorism intelligence fusion centers depends on 
significant dialogue among civilian intelligence, EMS, law enforcement, homeland 
security, and medical communities regarding the considerations, practices, and strategic 
consequences of using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors. Without this dialogue, the 
use of EMS personnel as intelligence sensors will not be sanctioned by the medical 
community or the public, most EMS systems and personnel will decline to serve as 
intelligence sensors, and important collection assets will be lost.  The failure to deploy 
EMS personnel as information collection assets would be unfortunate, because there is a 
very real possibility that EMS personnel could provide critical clues to prevent, preempt, 
or interdict a terrorist attack in the United States, as they did to prevent the car bombing 
attacks in London on June 29, 2007.  
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